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Abstract
This article interrogates three key arguments derived from
the functional approach to studying the core executive: (1)
that coordination is the primary problem that confronts
executive decision-makers; (2) that improved coordination
will lead to better governance; and (3) that linkage problems
dissipate as policy systems consolidate. Drawing on the
experience of hitherto understudied small states, including
112 interviews with political elites, we show how the
effects of country size create governance challenges in the
form of leader dominance, patronage systems and capacity
constraints. Our findings support the call to broaden the
focus of functional analysis beyond its traditional emphasis
on coordination. For scholars of small states we synthesize
existing empirical findings and provide a theoretical justifi-
cation for future work using an adaptation of the core exec-
utive approach.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Three decades ago the term ‘core executive’ was introduced by Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990) to replace ‘cabinet
government’ and better explain central government decision-making. They argued that the phrase cabinet govern-
ment was misleading in assuming a primary coordination mechanism. It had also become a normative assertion about
how government should be run rather than an analytical device for empirical study. Since then, the phrase core exec-
utive has transformed conceptualizations of central government (Elgie 2011) because its focus on the ‘complex web
of institutions, networks and practices surrounding the PM, Cabinet, cabinet committees and their official counter-
parts, less formalized ministerial “clubs” or meetings, bilateral negotiations, and interdepartmental committees’
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(Rhodes 2017, p. 138) better explained how the apex of government worked. The emphasis on coordination also
complemented the related shift, especially in the Anglo-European literature, from the study of ‘government’ to ‘gov-
ernance’ (Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1997; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). Consequently, the core executive is
said to form part of the field's ‘new orthodoxy’ (Elgie 2011; Marsh 2011; Andeweg et al. 2020).
Despite attempting to move away from the assumption that cabinet is the primary coordination mechanism, the
approach attracted criticism for retaining coordination as the predominant focus of analysis. Andeweg (1997, p. 59),
for example, questioned whether ‘coordination should be the defining function of Cabinet government’, arguing that
a fixation with this function meant that the approach did not dispel ‘the fog around the edges of the concept of Cabi-
net government’. For Andeweg, a focus on other aspects of executive decision-making, like accountability or legiti-
macy, would better link input and output functions. The geographic concentration of existing studies in large,
wealthy states in Europe, North America and Japan where coordination is the primary challenge reinforced this pre-
disposition (Elgie 2011), and occurred despite Dunleavy and Rhodes' (1990) argument that a key virtue of the frame-
work was that it enabled a more explicitly comparative approach. Heilman and Stepan's (2016) study of China
provides an exception but, again, the focus on a large state where coordination is ‘most likely’ to be an issue restricts
the concept's global applicability.
There are two distinct approaches to the core executive: the resource dependency approach and the functional
approach. Elgie (2011) argues that the former assumes that actors in the core executive depend on others to achieve
their goals; that to do so they exchange resources; that this takes the form of a game in which they seek to minimize
dependence and maximize resources; that games overlap and no one actor dominates; and that resources are not
fixed. This approach builds on a rationalist logic that focuses on the utility maximization of individual actors in the
executive. However, as Elgie (2011) further outlines, scholars who adopt this perspective usually retain a structural
element to their analysis because they see resources as located in specific positions. By contrast, Rhodes (1997,
p. 1247) explicitly argues that resources are not fixed. Thus, while scholars use the term ‘core executive’, the
resource dependency approach is better characterized as an extension of the pre-1990s studies rather than the step
change Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990) envisaged (cf. Andeweg et al. 2020).
The functional approach, by contrast, has tended to be descriptive, ‘charting changes in the organizations within
the core executive and how their roles have changed’ (Elgie 2011, p. 70). The primary focus has been coordination
and specifically how the centre of government ensures policy coherence among the wider political system, including
networks of bureaucrats, party organizations and civil society. Analysis has revolved around establishing three core
arguments (see Brady and Catterall 1997; Goetz and Margetts 1999; Holliday and Shinoda 2002; Burch and
Holliday 2004; and Elgie 2011 for review): (1) that coordination between actors and institutions is the primary prob-
lem that confronts executive decision-makers; (2) that improved coordination will lead to better governance; and (3)
that coordination problems dissipate as policy systems consolidate.
To interrogate the relevance of these claims we focus on six ‘least likely’ cases for coordination problems
(Gerring 2007; Levy 2008): small states from three world regions (Europe, the Caribbean and the Pacific), thus far
largely excluded from comparative studies of executive governance. Small states are ‘least likely’ cases for coordina-
tion challenges because their governance is defined by intimate social networks and the hyper-personalization of
politics (Corbett and Veenendaal 2018), which should increase harmonization between the actors who make up the
core executive. That is not to say coordination wouldn't be a problem in small states. But we would expect other
challenges to be more significant. Following the logic of a ‘least likely’ design, if coordination is the primary challenge
then this supports conventional wisdom in functional analysis by adding new and unique cases. If it isn't, then our
cases support Andeweg's (1997) claim that the functional approach needs to be broadened to include other chal-
lenges, such as accountability and legitimacy, alongside coordination. Further work might then test whether this is
true of all small states or only those considered here. Either way, the significance of our intervention turns on linking
the literature on executive studies with scholarship on how state size affects governance practices, including our
own empirical work on small states (see especially Veenendaal 2014; Corbett 2015a; and Corbett and
Veenendaal 2018).
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We find that arguments about the challenge of coordination in large, rich states have little empirical purchase in
small ones: these states are established policy systems in which small size and the highly personalized politics this
begets facilitate a natural level of informal coordination. However, rather than making executive decision-making
more flexible and effective, this leads to the centralization of executive authority. The formation and consolidation
of clientelistic networks also reduces state capacity. These dynamics appear in all six ‘most different’ small states
analysed, and we therefore hypothesize that these findings can be generalized to other small states (roughly 20 per
cent of all states have a population of less than one million citizens). Following Andeweg's (1997) call to broaden the
number of functions that the approach covers, we conclude that while the focus of core executive studies on contin-
gent relationships helps explain government in small states, the primary governance challenges in this context relate
to accountability and capacity, not coordination. We therefore contribute to the core executive literature by provid-
ing empirical evidence for a broader conceptualization of the functional approach. For scholars of small states, we
synthesize existing empirical findings and provide a theoretical justification for future work on the core executive.
To substantiate these claims we first review the literature on the core executive to connect debates about coor-
dination and linkages to arguments about the effects of state size. Second, we discuss our novel data and compara-
tive approach. Our analysis draws on 112 interviews with politicians, civil servants, journalists and civil society
actors.1 Our cases vary in terms of institutional design, colonial legacy, economic development, and party system. All
have populations below one million and small legislatures and cabinets (see Table 1). This combination of small size
and variation on the other main variables that might explain differences between executive functions is key to our
empirical contribution. Third, we provide an empirical investigation of how the core executive works in six small
states. We structure this discussion around the three functional arguments outlined above. We conclude by dis-
cussing the implications of our findings for core executive studies.
2 | THE CORE EXECUTIVE AND STATE SIZE
Dunleavy and Rhodes' (1990) criticism of older studies of cabinet government concerned their tendency to focus on
the extent of prime ministerial predominance relative to cabinet. The core executive concept sought to advance a
relational approach that emphasized the webs of actors and institutions at the heart of decision-making, focusing
attention on how government functions were coordinated rather than positing that either prime minister or cabinet
predominated. The key distinction was not to assume that power was fixed to a particular position but that accumu-
lating and exercising authority was both ‘contingent and relational’ and therefore fluid (Rhodes 1997). Functionalists
identify systemic, political and organizational constraints to core executive decision-making, thus drawing ‘attention
to the extent and efficacy of, and the various mechanisms for, coordination’ (Elgie 2011, p. 65). So, Burch and
Holliday (2004) show how the evolution of policy development, policy presentation, public sector reform and public
service delivery under the Blair government attempted to marry the principles of cabinet government with the
demands of modern media communications and personality-driven politics (cf. Brady and Catterall 1997). Similarly,
Holliday and Shinoda (2002) compared the function of the core executive in Britain and Japan, concluding that the
former had the greater capacity for coordination and ability to manage policy flows though the centre. However,
these studies largely ignored Andeweg's initial (1997) criticism that the approach should be broadened to include
other factors, such as accountability and legitimacy.
Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990) stressed that one value of the core executive concept over alternatives was its util-
ity in different contexts and institutional systems. Since its introduction to the study of British central government,
studies adopting a core executive approach have taken place in different contexts, across Europe and beyond
1Fourteen from Liechtenstein (see Veenendaal 2015), 13 from St Kitts-Nevis (see Veenendaal 2014), 22 from Malta (see Veenendaal 2019), 21 from
Suriname (see Veenendaal 2020); 27 from Samoa (see Corbett and Ng Shiu 2014) and 15 from Solomon Islands (see Corbett and Wood 2013;
Corbett 2015a).
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(Elgie 2011). However, even in the select few studies conducted outside large, wealthy states, coordination remained
the primary focus and concern. Goetz and Margetts' (1999; cf. Zubek and Goetz 2010) study of Central and Eastern
European countries found limited coordination within the executive and between the executive and other actors in
the political process. They hypothesized that these linkage problems would diminish as post-communist political sys-
tems were consolidated.
No specific studies exist of the core executive or cabinet in small states despite the fact that, in light of their
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executive government. The literature on public administration in small states, much of which is based on single
country studies or general analysis of public administration (Jugl 2019; Randma-Liiv and Sarapuu 2019), finds that:
human resources are limited and so individuals are often called upon to play multiple overlapping roles (Farrugia-
1993; Chittoo 2011; Everest-Phillips and Henry 2018); this has benefits in terms of informal coordination
(Chittoo 2011; Moloney 2019); but small size also blurs the line between politics and administration leading to con-
cerns about bureaucratic performance, conflicts of interest, patron–client linkages, and corruption (Benedict 1967,
pp. 47–48; Farrugia 1993; Baldacchino 1997, pp. 77–78; Ott 2000, pp. 37–39; Lodge et al. 2015); and this results in
small states being prone to hyper-personalism and power concentration (Farrugia 1993; Sutton and Payne 1993, p.
587; Gerring and Zarecki 2011, p. 23; Baldacchino 2012; Corbett and Veenendaal 2018). These findings are signifi-
cant because within large states there is an increasing desire to devolve or decentralize decision-making to smaller
political units (Lowndes and Sullivan 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2016; Ladner et al. 2016).
If these findings, typically emerging from single country or regional studies of public administration generally,
rather than central government specifically, are correct then we believe that the dominant functional approach and
its emphasis on coordination requires adaptation if it is to serve as a basis for comparative research. Although formal
executive processes in small states are often similar to large ones from whom their institutions were inherited—
cabinet routinely meets, papers are circulated, and decisions taken and agreed on—the predominance of informal
practices means that a key function is the distribution of the benefits of office (including cars and government
houses in poorer countries, channelling ministerial funds to constituencies, employing relatives and voters). This
trend is apparent regardless of institutional age or design. The upshot is that small states would appear to support
both Dunleavy and Rhodes' (1990) claim that we need an approach that recognizes that executive government is
‘relational and contingent’, and Andeweg's (1997) call to include a broader array of functions.
3 | METHOD AND DATA
Our study is necessarily exploratory and qualitative because, as the nascent literature on public administration in
small states indicates, their executives are predominantly characterized by informal practices and institutions
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004). To avoid the pitfall of selecting cases on the dependent variable, we adopt a co-
variational design (Blatter and Haverland 2012) focusing on six ‘most different’ (Lijphart 1971) small states: in Europe
(Liechtenstein and Malta); the Caribbean (St Kitts and Nevis and Suriname); and the Pacific (Samoa and Solomon
Islands). In addition to having populations of less than one million, these states all have relatively small legislatures
and cabinet memberships, and are classified as democracies in the Freedom House index, the only aggregate democ-
racy dataset that includes the smallest states.2 But they differ on all the usual dimensions that comparative politics
scholars typically employ to explain political outcomes: geographical location, (colonial) history, political institutions,
physical fragmentation and economic development. They also differ with respect to the duration of their political
frameworks, enabling examination of the claim that coordination challenges dissipate over time. Most importantly,
they include both presidential and parliamentary systems (and a monarchy), and both single-party and coalition gov-
ernments. Consequently, any similarities between these cases, and implicit divergence from mainstream functional
theories, must be credited to the one shared contextual variable: small size.
We thus compare explicitly between our six cases and implicitly between the experience of small states and the
assumptions about the core executive derived from a functional perspective in large states. We present the empirical
material thematically rather than case by case to directly tackle the arguments from the core executive literature.
The similarities and differences between these states along the dimensions we consider are summarized in Table 2.
2Liechtenstein has a long history of free and fair elections and respect for civil liberties. However, the increasingly active role of Liechtenstein's prince has
led to heightened concern about the country's democratic credentials (Wolf 2016). Furthermore, in terms of Freedom House's dimension of political rights
all other small states (except St Kitts and Nevis) also have a suboptimal score of ‘2’ rather than ‘1’; hence, none of these countries is a ‘perfect’ democracy
(Corbett and Veenendaal 2018).
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Significantly, while the formal institutions and mechanisms for coordination vary considerably between these six
cases, informal practices are largely similar, supporting the emphasis by scholars who employ a functional approach
that treats executive government as relational and contingent. However, as we will show, the effects of country size
mean that accountability and capacity issues are more pertinent challenges than coordination.
Any investigation that seeks to describe the factors that shape collective decision-making and situate them in
relevant theory must combine the depth of a single case study with the breadth of multi-country comparison. This is
made easier in our case because the size of our cases ensures some ‘family resemblance’ (Collier and Mahon 1993;
Boswell and Corbett 2017). Interviews were conducted with people with the most intense involvement in political
practices: political elites (both government ministers and opposition politicians), senior public servants, NGO (non-
governmental organizations) representatives, journalists, other civil society activists, donor consultants, local aca-
demics, and private sector representatives. Most interviews were recorded and we include relevant quotations. In
addition to formal interviews, many informal conversations added to our understanding of political practice. Inter-
view material was supplemented from public sources (newspapers, social media, diaries, biographies, and autobiogra-
phies, records of parliamentary debates, departmental and consultancy reports). For triangulation, this primary
material was complemented by an extensive survey of the area studies literature on the six countries.
4 | THE CORE EXECUTIVE AND SMALL STATES
The following section interrogates the three main arguments about coordination identified by functional studies of
the core executive. First, we consider whether coordination between actors and institutions is the primary problem
that confronts executive decision-makers. We find instead that the concentration of authority is a more salient con-
cern. Second, we consider whether coordination leads to better governance. We find instead that the concentration
of authority leads to clientelism and patronage-based politics. Third, we consider whether coordination problems dis-
sipate over time. We find that capacity problems persist regardless of how old or rich small states are and that this is
a more pressing challenge than coordination.
4.1 | Argument 1: Coordination between actors and institutions is the primary problem
that confronts executive decision-makers
Small states have smaller executives than larger states (Gerring and Veenendaal 2020). In practice, this means that
ministers and other officials must play multiple, overlapping, roles. This pattern is most acute in the smallest states in
TABLE 2 Formal and informal governance patterns*





concentration Patronage State capacity
Liechtenstein Monarchy Coalition Separate High Entrenched Moderate
Malta Parliamentary Single party Fused High Entrenched Moderate
St Kitts & Nevis Parliamentary Single party Fused High Entrenched Limited
Suriname Hybrid Coalition Separate High Entrenched Limited
Samoa Parliamentary Single party Fused High Entrenched Limited
Solomon Islands Parliamentary Coalition Fused High Entrenched Severely limited
*The information in this table is drawn from our own empirical material.
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our sample, St Kitts and Nevis and Liechtenstein, with cabinets of nine and five, respectively. Two examples indicate
the range and diversity of portfolio responsibilities: Minister of Agriculture, Health, National Health Insurance,
Human Settlement, Community Development, Gender Affairs, Social Services, Lands and Co-operatives (St Kitts and
Nevis); and Minister for Commerce, Industry and Labour; Public Enterprises; Samoa Land Corporation; Housing Cor-
poration; Accident Compensation Corporation; Samoa Sports & Facilities Authority; and Polynesian Airlines (Samoa).
Having all of these roles overseen by one individual makes coordination much simpler. Moreover, while the formal
institutional arrangements of small states mirror those of large ones, close personal connections ensure that gover-
nance is more informal because ‘everybody knows everybody’ (Corbett 2015b). The key difference between large
and small states is that the latter have a natural level of social intimacy and informality between members of the
executive, and between the executive and the general population. The benefit of this informality is that governance
in small states tends to be more flexible and dynamic (cf. Lijphart 1977; Katzenstein 1985). This flexibility is particu-
larly important because of the economic and international vulnerability of small states, which often calls for swift pol-
icy adjustments and decisive executive actions (Katzenstein 1985).
The trade-off is that while informality and multiple, overlapping roles serve a practical purpose, they also
result in concentration of power amongst key leaders who are able to dominate all aspects of political, economic
and social life, reminiscent of earlier prime minister versus cabinet debates that the core executive framework
sought to usurp. We are not, however, suggesting that a formal, hierarchical explanation would be better at
accounting for the practice of executive government in small states. Rather, the key point of our intervention is
that, due to their small size, the predominance of one or a few leaders who are able to achieve centralized, top-
down dominance of the executive occurs without significant disruption to the speed of government decision-
making or the ability of political elites to have an intimate knowledge of local context and policy detail. As
Larmour (1999) highlights, prime ministers and individual ministers in small states often know the precise location
and activity of government vehicles, ships, aircraft and other equipment, alongside specific knowledge of the
design and construction of government infrastructure. This marrying of high-level control and intimate involve-
ment is not possible in a larger state where a minister might have a more specialized portfolio but responsibility
for many more staff, equipment and projects.
This situation is most pronounced in Samoa, where one party has ruled for over three decades, and Liechten-
stein, where the Prince has recently increased his constitutional powers vis-à-vis the elected executive. The domi-
nance of the Human Rights Protection Party in Samoa is the result of a series of strategic institutional adaptations,
including manipulating the loyalty of MPs to continuously weaken the opposition, co-opting traditional institutions,
and limiting the press (So'o 2008; Iati 2013). The upshot is that the country has only had two Prime Ministers since
1988. Their longevity has led to persistent criticisms of corruption but has not harmed the HRPP electorally, with
the 2016 election delivering the most comprehensive victory in the party's history. In Liechtenstein, the notion of
‘dualism’ enshrined in the constitution ensures that the Prince rules together with government ministers, who are
accountable both to the monarch and to parliament. The Liechtenstein core executive thus consists of an ambiguous
mix of elected and unelected leaders (Veenendaal 2015), but they rarely clash because ministers know that the
Prince has greater constitutional authority and popular legitimacy than they do.
In Caribbean Westminster systems (see Ryan 1999), represented here by St Kitts and Nevis, leader dominance is
channelled via two-party systems. The same is true in Malta, which is also a former British colony, where competition
is often fiercely antagonistic. Polarization is reinforced by patron–client linkages. Access to state services critically
depends on which politician or political party is in power, magnifying their personal significance. One consequence is
very high levels of voter turnout (over 95 per cent of registered voters participating in elections) despite the absence
of compulsory voting (Hirczy 1995; Veenendaal 2019). As one Maltese politician explained, few can escape political
tribalism, and independent or neutral positions are almost impossible to maintain:
Everything here is a zero-sum game. So there is essentially … almost no space for independent critical
thinking. You belong to one tribe and if you don't belong to that tribe, it must be that you are against
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it. You can't be neutral, you cannot be neutral. There is no space for that, and if you start behaving in
a way that criticizes both political parties, for example, then you must be mad.
The final two small states—Suriname and Solomon Islands—are ‘least likely’ cases for power concentration
because they are fragmented or ‘deeply divided’ societies. Suriname is often considered a successful multicul-
tural democracy, with five distinct ethnic groups competing peacefully in democratic elections
(Veenendaal 2020). However, the main logic driving its multi-ethnic coalitions is the desire to ensure that each
ethnic group has access to the spoils of government, with political parties ‘colonizing’ the state to distribute
public resources among their constituents (Ramsoedh 2016). The absence of ideology means that all political
parties can cooperate with each other, but government formation is a complex and unpredictable process with
personal connections between political leaders playing a significant role. This may not result in a single domi-
nant leader as in the other four states, but the exclusive nature of these negotiations means that authority
remains highly centralized.
Our final case, Solomon Islands, has never had a dominant political party. Instead, ephemeral groupings rise and
fall on the strength of leadership candidates and their ambitions (Steeves 1996). When they do form, parties have lit-
tle influence on their members, who frequently change sides and even contradict themselves, a practice termed
locally as ‘grasshopper politics’ (Foukona 2018). Consequently, cabinet government in Solomon Islands has been per-
petually unstable, with prime ministers constantly battling to hold together disparate coalitions between elections.
Specifically, it has become relatively common for governments to be removed via votes of no confidence, with much
of the prime minister's time spent placating disgruntled MPs. Former Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, Rick
Hou (2016, p. 2) describes how, on entering office:
I came to understand the reality of the Solomon Islands political landscape: there are no political
parties—only a ‘numbers game’. In fact, the so-called political parties going into the elections are usu-
ally just collections of individuals with certain interests, not necessarily anything to do with national
interests. One sees these interests coming out at the time of the election of the prime minister. It is
not unusual to have successful candidates from a ‘political party’ ending up on opposite sides of the
political aisle after the election of the prime minister. The numbers game is such that you can have
arch rivals ‘in bed’ politically.
Alongside rapid turnover, in cases like Solomon Islands where political parties are absent, the executive can fragment,
with ministers running their own portfolios without coordinated policy positions (Corbett and Wood 2013). But, as
we demonstrate below, even in this context, informal coordination is still relatively easy given the size of the govern-
ment and the civil service.
The concentration of power typically occurs at the expense of civil society, which is characteristically absent in
small states. Politicians and citizens often have close personal connections (Baldacchino 2002). In turn, this stifles
criticism and dissent. Citizens are typically economically and socially dependent on government, weakening their
opportunities to freely express themselves, undermining the formation and strength of civil society groups or non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that, in larger countries, function to check executive power. Likewise, newspa-
pers and other media are avenues for holding governments to account in large states, but in small states indepen-
dence of the press is harder to sustain due to economies of scale and social pressure on individual journalists
(Puppis 2009). News providers are often government owned and therefore open to manipulation and co-option by
ruling elites. According to a St Kitts and Nevis journalist:
We have independent media, but this is such a small community that media houses are even reluctant
to critique the financial records of major companies, because they don't want to lose the corporate
sponsorship for the radio programming. So media houses here operate with some degree of
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apprehension with regard to possible consequences from the government or from some bigger pri-
vate sector organizations.
Small state media are also hampered by limited resources. The consequent absence of investigative journalism, com-
bined with the informality of face-to-face politics in small states, paradoxically creates opaque political decision-
making.
One consequence of weak civil society institutions is that the executive dominates all other political institutions.
Because the executive either directly or indirectly controls virtually all public institutions, the distinction between
the ruling party, the government and the state becomes blurred. Election victories can translate into near-total con-
trol of the state apparatus, while defeat leaves the other party and its supporters almost completely powerless. A
Maltese journalist elaborated:
Here you can see also that elections are perceived as a complete takeover of power. So in a normal
democracy, you're choosing the prime minister or a powerful person, you're choosing a cabinet, you're
choosing members of parliament. But the civil service, for example, does provide continuity. Local
municipalities provide continuity, federal government provides continuity, the police provide continu-
ity. Here, the perception is that if a government is switching from Labour to Nationalist, everything is
going to change.
In sum, coordination between actors and institutions is not the primary problem that confronts executive decision-
makers in small states because they are small in number and able to marry high-level control of policy mechanisms
with intimate knowledge of local context and the status of key projects. The trade-off is that informal coordination
and concentration of authority among key individuals who have the capacity to dominate political, economic and
social life are more salient features of small state politics. They are also the aspects of political practice that
reformers usually express most concern about given their implications for accountability and governance capacity.
4.2 | Argument 2: Improved coordination will lead to better governance
Scholars of the core executive in large states argue that if coordination problems are resolved then the delivery of
services will improve. We might assume that, ceteris paribus, highly networked societies where informal coordination
and leader dominance is the norm would be advantaged by small size. Instead, echoing Jugl (2019), we find that the
predominance of individuals over programmatic service delivery leads more naturally to clientelism and patronage-
based politics. As the literature on clientelism, patronage and other forms of particularistic politics indicates
(Keefer 2007; Hicken 2011), these patterns tend to produce governance particularistic outcomes. First, the appoint-
ment of civil servants on the basis of political loyalty rather than merit means that small states tend to have over-
sized, partisan and often ineffective bureaucracies. Second, while clientelism may alleviate poverty, the absence of
anonymity in small states means that the distribution of resources is often highly partisan, increasing inequality
between groups.
The political economy of poor small states means that most citizens aspire to have family members in secure,
well-paid bureaucratic employment. Consequently: ‘Small state government is characteristically weighty and omni-
present and, as a result, omnipotent’ (Baldacchino 1997, p. 69). Distribution of bureaucratic jobs is thus an important
spoil of office with voters typically expecting politicians to fulfil personal requests, creating patron–client linkages.
As one Maltese politician explained:
The danger of succumbing to that pressure in a small community like ours is enormous, because
remember, these are the people you meet every Sunday when you go to church, whom your wife
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meets if she goes shopping in a supermarket. And you're constantly bombarded by all of this, so this
is a downside that creates enormous risks.
Consequently, public sector reform and bureaucratic rationalization have been especially problematic: small states'
politicians are keenly aware that cutting public sector jobs verges on political suicide (Sutton 2007). The absence of
welfare provision in small states ensures that redistributive politics and cabinet government are mutually reinforcing
because ‘[p]atronage has … helped Caribbean governments mitigate poverty and social exclusion’ (Duncan and
Woods 2007, p. 211). Clientelism and patronage allow political elites in small states to solidify and augment their
authority among the electorate, and while citizens may be cynical about the intentions of politicians, by selling their
votes they contribute to the survival of this system. One interviewed leader of a Surinamese political party stated:
Of course political parties in Suriname are not formed on an ideological basis, and this is also not
important for cooperation. Of course all parties enter the election with the goal to end up in govern-
ment. You can enter this cooperation with any of the parties, and this is based on an agreement: who
gets what, and who gets which part of the cake? …Who gets the high offices of President, Vice-President,
Speaker of Parliament, ministers? And of course also things like foreign posts, ambassadors, and those
kinds of things.
According to some interviewees, the prevalence of patron–client linkages also means that people become overly
dependent on the government in power. As one public official from St Kitts and Nevis argued:
Too many of the people of these islands live dependently on the government, and so they look for
patronage and all sorts of benefits and assistance from the government, rather than being sufficiently
independent in act, in deed, and in thought. So you have this dependency syndrome in which too
many people depend on the politicians for five years. And then when election time comes the politi-
cians say: ‘Well, time to pay me back. Give me the vote.’ And so that militates against democracy.
As elsewhere, patronage in the Surinamese public sector has also created an oversized and ineffective civil service,
which functions as an enormous drain on public resources. Because there are too many employees, many have little
work to do and are even asked to stay home, becoming ‘ghost’ officers or workers (Dutch: spookambtenaren) on the
payroll of their ministry. This phenomenon is not uncommon in other small states.
Bureaucrats and politicians may be related and the former may be selected on that basis. In Solomon Islands
wantoks (literally, one language—in a country of more than 60 languages) are often given preference by kin in
employment at all levels, in the expectation that reciprocal obligations will be fulfilled, leading to both corruption and
inefficiency. Constituency development funds (CDFs)—where MPs are allocated state funds for discretionary use
(Fraenkel 2011)—attract particular criticism for encouraging corruption and mismanagement. The popularity of CDFs
underscores the type of ‘bargain’ (Lodge and Stirton 2009) made by the political class to ensure that systems
designed for large states work in small ones. Resource distribution in wealthier small states, like Liechtenstein, is an
exception to this general trend as revenues from offshore finance and banking are so high that an extensive welfare
state (with very cheap or even free education and healthcare) is viable despite limited taxation. But, even in Liechten-
stein, blurred lines of accountability and conflicts of interest fuel persistent criticisms of corruption and patronage.
Executive politics in small states is thus often ‘spoils’ politics (Buker 2005), with ministers using their position to grant
preferential access to resources and employment for their constituents.
In sum, while small states have a natural level of coordination due to informal networks and the concentration
of authority in the hands of key leaders, this does not mean that service delivery necessarily improves. Rather, both
trends fuel clientelism and patronage-based politics that undermine programmatic policy delivery, create a bloated
bureaucracy, blur lines of accountability, and heighten concern with corruption.
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4.3 | Argument 3: Linkage problems dissipate as policy systems consolidate3
A similar prevalence of patronage and clientelism occurs in new or developing democracies elsewhere. As Goetz and
Margetts (1999) highlight, in such circumstances we could attribute these challenges to the newness of liberal demo-
cratic states. Most small states, including Malta, St Kitts and Nevis, Samoa and Solomon Islands, have been democra-
cies since independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Our sample also includes one state never colonized in the modern
era (Liechtenstein), and one that experienced an authoritarian regime (Suriname) between 1980 and 1987.
Irrespective of their previous regime type, the presence of colonial rule, or even authoritarian government, according
to Goetz and Margetts' (1999) argument we would expect to find that coordination problems will dissipate over time.
Our cases challenge this claim. Regardless of their age—the youngest democracy (Suriname) is 30 years old while the
oldest (Liechtenstein) has been a democracy since 1921—the primacy of informal coordination and the concentration
of executive authority is common to all, as outlined above. Similarly, as we have shown, political practices (including
clientelism) are persistent features of political life that have not faded as policy systems have aged. The final point
we make to counter this argument is the other perpetual governance challenge for small states that we have only
hinted at thus far: administrative capacity constraints—that is, limited human resources—created by the attempt to
operate institutions designed for large states in small societies.
Like ministers, bureaucrats in small states are neither specialized nor do they ‘enjoy the luxury of concentrating
on one responsibility or a specific cluster of concerns’ (Farrugia 1993, p. 222). They thus face ‘severe and permanent
challenges’ in accessing an adequate range and depth of technical skills to fulfil the basic functions required for such
crucial issues as monitoring public expenditure and maintaining financial accountability (Haque et al. 2012). Officials
in small states lack the interchange, access to new knowledge and stimulus provided by professional associations
and meetings and may ‘live in a condition of professional loneliness’ (Jacobs 1975, p. 141). Key people may often be
abroad for substantial periods of time and be unavailable to manage and discuss national development. Moreover,
the government role extends into what is the private sector elsewhere, broadening the scope and dimensions of
executive interests and diffusing core competences and time on the job. This presents wide-ranging possibilities for
malfeasance and corruption, long evident in the Solomon Islands forestry sector, for example (Hameiri 2012).
Given the limited pool of human resources in small states, a few qualified individuals often perform a variety of
roles, including in business, journalism, the civil service, or third sector organizations. These overlapping functions
create potential for frequent conflicts of interest. As a Surinamese politician highlights:
Especially in parliament we see that people sometimes receive three salaries, all from state funds ….
And these salaries are very high in comparison to ordinary jobs. Some politicians are simultaneously
policy advisers in ministries, or they are school directors or directors of other public institutions. And
as an MP, how are you going to objectively discuss the budget of these institutions if you yourself are
employed there? So that is not right, seeing that you have to exercise control in parliament.
While Suriname has attempted to introduce legislation to prohibit such ‘double functions’, the excessive costs of
establishing and maintaining patron–client networks also means that most politicians are reluctant to give up their
additional roles, reducing the time available to discharge any particular function effectively. Conflicts of interest are a
problem for all states, but overlapping roles and close personal connections between politicians and citizens means
that awareness of them is magnified in small societies.
These challenges are exacerbated by successful bureaucrats moving to growing numbers of regional and interna-
tional organizations (Baker 1992; Liki 2001), which may not necessarily represent the interests of their government.
Even aid agencies, including international NGOs, provide many good jobs and create ‘perverse incentives’ that ‘result
in a flow of administrative and technical talent from the public sector’ (Moore 2011, p. 1771). Such individuals often
3The material in this section has been adapted with permission from Corbett and Connell (2015).
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continue to work on policy issues relevant to small states but are no longer specifically involved in national develop-
ment. Limited economic growth and development opportunities have also resulted in substantial out-migration,
including of highly skilled workers, notably in the health sector, leading to brain drain and a reduced pool of qualified
professionals. Poor career prospects and low pay (except in Liechtenstein and to some extent Malta), limited recogni-
tion, frequent reshuffles and lack of clear policy direction discourage public sector employment, and deaden enthusi-
asm. Some of those with ambition and education, who might be expected to offer leadership and management
expertise, have left, permanently or temporarily. Such trends have been apparent for several decades in contexts
where ‘only a few brains need to be drained before a serious systemic crisis occurs’ (Baker 1992, p. 16). Conse-
quently, senior positions may be unfilled because of scarce qualified personnel. Those acquiring formal qualifications
or marketable skills tend to seek employment in better-remunerated roles with donor agencies or overseas. The con-
sequence is a perpetual shortage of both people and skills (Haque et al. 2012, pp. 16–17). Turnover within particular
departments and ministries is a further complication, while even more rapid turnover characterizes political
representatives.
Further pressure on the scarce human resources of small states follows the increased expectation that they will
participate in international meetings and organizations. For island states this is strongly linked to climate change and
its anticipated impact on their future prosperity and even existence. International forums are increasingly highly
technical arenas and both political leaders and public service delegates rely heavily on the advice of officials for ana-
lytical support. However, while complex international negotiations require complex technical knowledge, the recruit-
ment, development and retention of high-quality officials are perpetual challenges. One solution to this dilemma,
which is employed by European microstates like Liechtenstein, is to ‘outsource’ these functions to larger neigh-
bouring states. Liechtenstein has adopted the Swiss franc as its currency and makes use of the Swiss postal service,
while Switzerland also undertakes much of Liechtenstein's consular and diplomatic representation in foreign affairs.
In sum, capacity constraints created by the need for small states to operate institutions designed for large states
with limited, and often diminishing, human resources are a constant challenge regardless of how old or well consoli-
dated political systems are. This trend is exacerbated by ‘brain drain’, which further intensifies the need for individ-
uals to fulfil overlapping roles. Like the centralization of authority and clientelism, these capacity issues are more
prominent challenges than coordination for small states.
5 | CONCLUSION
The key distinction between the core executive approach as formulated by Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990) and older
studies of cabinet government is that the former does not assume that power is fixed to a particular position but that
accumulating and exercising authority was both ‘contingent and relational’ and therefore fluid. This emphasis aligns
with the practice of executive politics in small states. However, as Andeweg (1997) highlights, most studies that
adopted a functional approach to the core executive have focused on coordination as the pre-eminent governance
challenge, often to the exclusion of other factors. In doing so they have argued that: coordination between actors
and institutions is the primary problem that confronts executive decision-makers; improved coordination will lead to
better governance; and linkage problems dissipate as policy systems consolidate.
As we have shown, coordination is not the primary governance challenge in small states, regardless of their
world region, institutional system, political system consolidation, colonial legacy or economic development. Rather,
as Table 2 shows, leader dominance and the concentration of authority, clientelism and patronage, and capacity
issues are paramount.
Consequently, the functional approach needs to be adapted if it is going to serve as the basis for comparative
research beyond large, wealthy states. Specifically, following Andeweg (1997), we have argued that a focus on
accountability and capacity are more pertinent to small states. While we concede that these are ‘least likely’ cases
for coordination problems, our exploratory analysis nevertheless indicates that there are good reasons why these
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factors might also be significant elsewhere. Indeed, studies adopting a functional approach outside large, rich states
echo our findings (e.g., Goetz and Margetts 1999). But, they tend to assume that these problems will dissipate once
policy systems consolidate. Our analysis, resting as it does on the empirical data of policy systems that are all at least
30 years old, indicates that this argument is also problematic.
One further way of substantiating our claims would be to focus on what Rhodes and his co-authors refer to as
‘court politics’ (Rhodes and Tiernan 2016) and its implications for the practice of executive governance in small
states. This approach retains a focus on the relational and contingent nature of executive government by
foregrounding the influence of intentional agents and the coalitions they form. But, rather than functions, it pays
greater attention to the meanings and beliefs of key actors, the manoeuvring and strategizing required to realize pol-
icy goals, and the intrigue and conspiracy that inevitably follows success and failure of key personalities. Given the
hyper-personalized nature of small state politics, a ‘court politics’ approach suggests distinct advantages for the study
of executive decision-making. Space precludes a focus on individual small state courts here but, given the increasing
number of such studies in larger states, small state scholars undertaking future research on executive decision-mak-
ing may well regard this as a better explanatory framework.
Here we have taken the more modest but still fundamental intermediary step of highlighting the limitations of
the functional approach, as currently utilized, when applied to a distinct context: small states. Small states are easily
dismissed as exotic, extreme cases that have little to offer by way of general lessons. We disagree. Because there are
more small states than ever—roughly 20 per cent of all states—their experience is more common than that of large,
wealthy European democracies. If one of the key virtues of the core executive approach is that it will improve com-
parative analysis, then the experiences of these cases is an important empirical test for supposedly universal theo-
ries. By studying the practice of executive government in small states we also learn something about large
states, too.
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